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I. INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that statements obtained from suspects subjected to “custodial inter-
rogation”2 are inadmissible in criminal proceedings unless the interro-
gators issue warnings of the rights to remain silent and to have
counsel present during interrogations.3 The Court clarified that custo-
dial interrogation can occur outside the police station. The Court de-
clared: “Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves
to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves.”4
One context “outside criminal court proceedings” that is particu-
larly problematic is the school setting when juvenile students are
questioned at school.5 As will be shown, courts consistently hold that
students are not in custody when questioned solely by school adminis-
trators. In such situations, students need not be read Miranda warn-
ings, even when the fruits of such questioning are ultimately used in
juvenile or criminal court proceedings.6 It is a different story when
questioning involves school resource officers (SROs) or police officers.
Some courts find that students subjected to such interrogation are in
custody and officers must give Miranda warnings. Other courts find
the situation to be non-custodial.7 One court described such inconsis-
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Court concluded that custodial interrogation is “inherently coercive.” See in-
fra section II.C.
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
4. Id.
5. See generally Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the
Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39 (2006); cases discussed in-
fra notes 81–94 and accompanying text.
6. Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource
Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 233 (2018); see also infra notes 88–89 (providing
state cases where courts have held that students who are questioned by school
administrators are not in custody for purposes of Miranda).
7. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 235–36; D.Z. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 246 (Ind. 2018).
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tency as “messy,”8 while a leading commentator observed that courts
“issue rulings on custody which appear to be utterly irreconcilable.”9
This Article attempts to provide resolution to the confused law gov-
erning school interrogations by arguing that students are not in cus-
tody for Miranda purposes when school administrators conduct
interrogations or are present when SROs or police officers question
students. This conclusion is justified by emerging social science evi-
dence that Miranda warnings are largely ineffective in informing stu-
dents of the substance of their rights. Even after being warned,
students seldom assert their right to remain silent and routinely con-
fess.10 Thus, requiring Miranda warnings is largely an exercise in fu-
tility that, as will be shown, sometimes has the perverse result of
excluding voluntary incriminating statements obtained through Mi-
randa violations. Moreover, this Article argues that when school au-
thorities participate in informing students of Miranda rights, the
school is teaching students the morally questionable lesson that fail-
ing to be forthcoming in telling the truth is acceptable. Finally, it will
be shown that school interrogations present a unique context justify-
ing withholding Miranda applicability.
While participation by school authorities in interrogations should
remove Miranda requirements, statements by unwarned students will
not automatically be admissible in juvenile or criminal proceedings
against the students. The traditional coerced confession doctrine will
still apply,11 rendering inadmissible any statement coerced under the
totality of the circumstances.
This Article proceeds by discussing in Part II Miranda and its
progeny defining the meaning of “custodial interrogation.” Part III dis-
cusses the current case law addressing the applicability of Miranda to
juveniles while at school. Part IV considers social science evidence
identifying differences between juveniles and adults that demon-
strates the ineffectiveness of Miranda warnings given to juveniles. Fi-
nally, Part V argues that school students are not considered in custody
for Miranda purposes when school authorities participate in student
interrogations. While such a conclusion requires the Supreme Court to
rethink its decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,12 this Article argues
that overruling J.D.B. is at home with other existing Supreme Court
case law.
8. B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 232 (Ind. 2018).
9. Paul Marcus, The Miranda Custody Requirement and Juveniles, 85 TENN. L. REV.
251, 287 (2017).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra section II.A.
12. See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text.
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II. MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY
A. Pre-Miranda Coerced Confession Doctrine
Until Miranda v. Arizona, states regulated police interrogations13
entirely by due process principles that precluded governmental use of
coerced confessions.14 The due process doctrine embraced a subjective
focus on the will of the suspect and denied the use of confessions that
were “involuntary” in light of the “totality of the circumstances.”15
The perceived inadequacy of the due process approach as the sole
constitutional check on police interrogation is well documented.16 The
vagueness of the voluntariness standard left the police with little gui-
dance in conducting interrogations so as to assure the admissibility of
confessions resulting therefrom.17 Such uncertainty resulted from the
process of case-by-case judicial assessments of whether the particular
suspect’s will was overborne,18 an issue hardly susceptible to objective
13. Confessions obtained from interrogations by federal authorities were subject
early on to the rigors of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
14. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
291–99 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the pre-Miranda due process era).
15. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620–21 (1961) (holding defen-
dant’s confession was not voluntary when defendant had a mental age of nine
years and police detained and questioned defendant for four nights and five
days); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1957) (reversing conviction on due
process grounds because police questioned a defendant who was of “low mentality
or mentally ill” over a two-week period while in custody).
16. See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND POLICY 1–76 (1980) (arguing that the “voluntariness” test preceding Miranda
was unworkable and ineffective); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and
the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979) (defending a revitalized due
process doctrine proposed as the sole basis for regulating police interrogations);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867–78
(1981) (outlining six defects in the due process voluntariness test).
17. Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 869.
18. Id. at 869–70. Some commentators expressed the inadequacy of the voluntariness
test in this way:
Judicial decisions speak in terms of the “voluntariness” of a confession,
but the term itself provides little guidance. To the extent “voluntariness”
has made a determination of the state of an individual’s will the crucial
question, it has not assisted analysis. Except where a person is uncon-
scious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all
incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—
are “voluntary” in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives. On
the other hand, if “voluntariness” incorporates notions of “but-for” cause,
the question should be whether the statement would have been made
even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually
no statement would be voluntary because very few people give incrimi-
nating statements in the absence of official action of some kind.
Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right
to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
62, 72–73 (1966).
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analysis.19 Moreover, because station house interrogation had always
been conducted in secret,20 defendants routinely experienced difficulty
recreating the interrogation process resulting in an inevitable “swear-
ing contest” generally won by the police.21 Such a police-dominated
atmosphere creates the obvious risk of undue pressure being exerted
upon suspects by zealous interrogators bent on solving crime. Mi-
randa was the Supreme Court’s black letter rule response to the short-
comings of the due process doctrine.
B. Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda v. Arizona considered the admissibility of statements ob-
tained from suspects subjected to custodial police interrogation with-
out the presence of counsel or warnings of constitutional rights. The
Court held that admitting these statements would violate the sus-
pect’s Fifth Amendment right not to “be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”22 The Court found that the at-
mosphere of custodial interrogation was inherently coercive23 and
thus “exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weak-
ness of individuals” in inducing their confessions.24 Therefore,
“[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”25
The “protective devices” articulated by the Court are the now-fa-
mous warnings: informing suspects that they have a right to remain
silent, that any statement they make may be used as evidence against
them, and that they have a right to counsel during interrogation at
State expense if they are indigent.26 The Court found that without
such warnings prior to interrogation, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, long cherished as a protection of defendants’ rights in judicial
proceedings,27 degenerates into a “form of words” effectively overrid-
19. See Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 869–70. The flexibility of the due process test
reduces certainty and predictability resulting in difficulty “for law enforcement
officers to conform to, and for courts to apply [the test] in a consistent manner.”
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 285 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2002)).
20. KAMISAR, supra note 16, at 27–32.
21. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 427 (7th ed. 1990).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
24. Id. at 455.
25. Id. at 458.
26. Id. at 444–45.
27. The Fifth Amendment is linked historically to the English struggle, as fought in
the church courts and the Star Chamber, to obtain freedom of religion and of
speech. Historically, the privilege was intended to bar pretrial examination by
magistrates. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968).
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den by police practices aimed at inducing statements from suspects
held incommunicado in the station house.28 If this is true, central con-
stitutional interests aimed at promoting government respect for
human dignity, maintaining a “fair state-individual balance,” and as-
suring an accusatorial system of criminal justice are compromised.29
While suspicious of police practices,30 the Miranda Court did not
prohibit station house interrogation as a legitimate law enforcement
tool.31 The police may still freely interrogate suspects so long as they
provide adequate warnings. Any statement or confession obtained is
admissible in evidence, provided suspects “knowingly and intelli-
gently” waive their right to silence or to the presence of counsel during
interrogation.32
C. “Custodial Interrogation”
In elaborating on the meaning of “custodial interrogation,” the Mi-
randa Court stated that suspects must be warned when “questioning
[is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way.”33 In subsequent cases, the Court made clear that cus-
tody is not limited to the police station but may include a suspect’s
bedroom,34 her presence in a police car after apprehension,35 or on-
the-scene questions asked by an officer immediately after arrest.36
While location does not necessarily define whether interrogation is
custodial, neither is the intention of the interrogator decisive. Rather,
“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s
position would have understood his situation.”37 In Illinois v. Perkins,
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
29. Id. at 460.
30. The Miranda Court extensively reviewed police manuals and other sources docu-
menting interrogation practices and concluded that widespread police miscon-
duct, or at least its risk, existed nationwide. Id. at 455–58.
31. Id. at 474–78.
32. Id. at 478–79. Voluntary confessions by persons not in police custody remain ad-
missible. Id. at 477–78.
33. Id. at 444.
34. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (holding Miranda was applicable
where four police officers entered suspect’s bedroom at 4 a.m. to question the
suspect about a shooting).
35. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (considering whether a sus-
pect “initiated” a Miranda interrogation by asking police a question while police
transported the suspect to jail in a squad car).
36. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–59 (1984) (holding Miranda
warnings inapplicable where the whereabouts of a gun were unknown and police
questioned the suspect in a supermarket minutes after suspect’s arrest).
37. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (holding that the roadside ques-
tioning by police of person stopped for a traffic offense is not custodial interroga-
tion for Miranda purposes).
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the Court made it clear suspects must have subjective awareness that
police are subjecting them to custodial interrogation—holding Mi-
randa warnings were not required when an undercover law enforce-
ment officer, posing as a fellow inmate, interrogated an incarcerated
suspect.38
The Court has offered a two-pronged definition of what constitutes
“interrogation” for Miranda purposes. Express questioning qualifies
as do “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.”39 The definition of interrogation “focuses primarily
upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the po-
lice” because the Miranda rules are meant to protect suspects from
coercion “without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of
the police.”40
III. MIRANDA AND JUVENILE INTERROGATION
In the context of the Fourth Amendment,41 the Supreme Court has
held that the Constitution protects school students against “unreason-
able searches and seizures,”42 although to a lesser extent than
adults.43 In light of the “special need” for school authorities to protect
schools from such evils as weapons and drugs,44 the Court relaxed the
usual “probable cause” threshold for reasonable searches and seizures
38. 496 U.S. 292 (1990). The Court explained:
Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate
the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a “police-
dominated atmosphere” and compulsion are not present when an incar-
cerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow
inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect.
When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not
officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking. . . .
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from
the interaction of custody and official interrogation. . . . Questioning by
captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create mutually
reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the sus-
pect’s will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing with
a government agent, these pressures do not exist.
Id. at 296–97 (citations omitted).
39. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). For a discussion of T.L.O., see gener-
ally Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an
Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the
Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897 (1988).
43. See Martin R. Gardner, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools: Observa-
tions on an Unsettled State of Search and Seizure Law, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 373,
378–80 (2000).
44. The T.L.O. Court identified a “major social problem” created by a recent plague of
drug use and violent crime in the schools. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
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to a “reasonable suspicion” standard. This allows educators flexibility
in performing their “custodial and tutelary” responsibilities over
students.45
The applicability of the Fifth Amendment in the school is another
matter. In the context of delinquency adjudications, the Supreme
Court has held the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and its attendant Miranda jurisprudence applicable to
juveniles.46 However, the Court has never decided a case addressing
the applicability of Miranda in school interrogations conducted solely
by school authorities.47
A. Supreme Court Cases
1. J.D.B. v. North Carolina
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,48 the Court addressed Miranda re-
quirements in the context of school interrogations conducted by school
authorities and police officers. J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old student
in seventh grade suspected of being involved in two home break-ins.49
A police investigator (DiCostanzo) entered J.D.B.’s school and in-
formed the school’s uniformed police officer (the school’s SRO) and two
school administrators that he intended to question J.D.B. regarding
the break-ins.50 The SRO removed J.D.B. from class and escorted him
to a school conference room occupied by DiCostanzo and the two
administrators.51
DiCostanzo and one of the administrators participated in a thirty-
to forty-five-minute interrogation.52 DiCostanzo led the interrogation
45. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (describing the role of
educators as “custodial and tutelary”).
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (applying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to delinquency adjudications). “Since the Gault decision, virtually all of the
courts that have passed on the question of the applicability of the Miranda safe-
guards to the juvenile process have concluded that the safeguards do apply.” SA-
MUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 176 (2d ed.
2019). Prior to the Miranda and Gault decisions, the Supreme Court applied the
due process voluntariness standard in assessing the admissibility of statements
made by juveniles to the police. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). The Court indicated that special attention be
given to the age of the suspect when evaluating the voluntariness of statements
given to the police by juveniles. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–600.
47. Kristi North, Recess is Over: Granting Miranda Rights to Students Interrogated
Inside School Walls, 62 EMORY L.J. 441, 443 (2012). As made clear by the text in
section III.A., the Court has held Miranda applicable to school interrogations
conducted by law enforcement agents with school officials present.
48. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
49. Id. at 265.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 265–66.
52. Id. at 266.
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and informed J.D.B. of the seriousness of the matter, telling him that
even if he returned the stolen property “this thing is going to court”
with the possibility that J.D.B. might be held in secure custody prior
to adjudication if DiCostanzo believed he might commit further of-
fenses.53 The administrator said little apart from urging J.D.B. to “do
the right thing,” warning that “the truth always comes out in the
end.”54
J.D.B. confessed to involvement in the break-ins and the state
court adjudicated J.D.B. as a delinquent.55 Neither the police nor the
SRO issued Miranda warnings prior to the confession.56 Two lower
courts, seeing the interrogation as non-custodial, affirmed the delin-
quency adjudication finding Miranda inapplicable.57 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Miranda custody
analysis requires consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.58
The Court ultimately held that courts and police must factor the
age of a juvenile suspect into the custody determination. The Court
observed that while any police interview has “coercive aspects to it,”59
only those interrogations that occur while a suspect is in “police cus-
tody”60 entail the “inherently compelling pressure” addressed in Mi-
randa.61 “[W]hether a suspect is ‘in custody’ is an objective
inquiry . . . ‘designed to give clear guidance to the police.’”62 The in-
quiry focuses on the circumstances of the interrogation and whether
“a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was at liberty to ter-
minate the interrogation and leave.”63 Thus, the subjective views of
either the interrogator or the one being interrogated are irrelevant.
Juvenile interrogations raise special concerns. Drawing from social
science recognized in earlier cases,64 the J.D.B. Court reiterated that
children are generally less mature and responsible than adults and
are more vulnerable to outside pressures than adults.65 The Court ac-
knowledged empirical studies demonstrating a heightened risk of
false confessions from youth,66 concluding that police cannot compare
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 268.
56. Id. at 266.
57. Id. at 268.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 269 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
62. Id. at 270–71 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)).
63. Id. at 270 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
64. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–72 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
65. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
66. Id. at 269.
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juveniles to adults when being interrogated.67 Thus, courts must take
the age of the child into account, yielding a standard defined in terms
of whether a reasonable child of that age would feel that they were in
custody.68
The fact that J.D.B.’s interrogation took place in school did not nec-
essarily render it non-custodial. The Court explained that “the effect
of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of
the person questioned. A student—whose presence at school is com-
pulsory and whose disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary ac-
tion—is in a far different position than . . . [others] on school
grounds.”69 With these considerations in mind, the Court remanded to
the state courts to determine whether J.D.B. was in custody when the
police interrogated him.70
It is worth noting that the Court did not find that the police-domi-
nated nature of J.D.B.’s interrogation necessarily rendered it custo-
dial. The custody issue is not determined by who conducts the
interrogation, but instead, by whether a reasonable person of the in-
terrogated student’s age would, under the totality of the circum-
stances, feel at liberty to leave the interrogation.
2. Fare v. Michael C.
Fare v. Michael C.71 is not a school interrogation case, as it in-
volves the interrogation of a sixteen-year-old suspect at a police sta-
tion. However, the Fare Court’s holding—that waivers of Miranda
rights by juveniles are to be assessed by the same test as applied to
adults72—has important implications for school interrogations.
Suspecting Michael of involvement in a murder, the police took
him into custody and issued Miranda warnings.73 Michael requested
67. Id. at 272–73.
68. Id. at 279. In an earlier case, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), the
Court addressed whether courts must consider a juvenile’s age in deciding
whether a young person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes. The Court rejected
the lower court’s conclusion that courts must account for the age and inexperi-
ence, where present, of particular juveniles questioned by police when deciding
whether they were in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. at 667–68. Instead, the
Court specified that the custody issue was an “objective” one satisfied when “a
reasonable person would [feel] at liberty to leave,” id. at 659, 664–65, without
requiring courts in all cases to factor in the person’s age or experience with the
legal system in making custody determinations, id. at 667–68.
69. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 276.
70. Id. at 281.
71. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
72. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
73. Fare, 442 U.S. at 710.
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to see his probation officer.74 The police denied the request and contin-
ued to interrogate Michael, who eventually confessed.75
The Supreme Court held that Michael’s request to see his proba-
tion officer neither constituted an assertion of his right to remain si-
lent nor his right to counsel.76 The Court found that Michael had
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights resulting in the admissibility of
his confession.77 In assessing the validity of the waiver, the Court af-
forded no special protections for juveniles waiving Miranda rights,
holding that the test applicable to adults applied equally to juveniles.
Waivers are valid if done “knowingly and intelligently” under the “to-
tality of the circumstances,” taking into account the age, experience,
and intelligence of the juvenile.78 The Court explained:
There is no reason to assume that . . . courts—especially juvenile courts, with
their special expertise in this area—will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that
are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education
and with immature judgment, are involved.79
74. Id.
75. Id. at 710–11.
76. Id. at 721–24.
77. Id. at 726.
78. Id. at 724–25.
79. Id. at 725. As the Fare case makes clear, juveniles are deemed capable of waiving
Miranda without having a parent, a lawyer, or other interested adult present. On
their own initiative, some states have added special protections for juveniles ei-
ther through statute or state constitution. See DAVIS, supra note 46, at 198–208.
A North Carolina statute is a representative example of a legislative response:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be
used against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custo-
dian present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that
one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not repre-
sented and wants representation.
(b) When the juvenile is less than 16 years of age, no in-custody admis-
sion or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evi-
dence unless the confession or admission was made in the presence of
the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney. If an attorney is
not present, the parent, guardian, or custodian as well as the juvenile
must be advised of the juvenile’s rights as set out in subsection (a) of this
section; however, a parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive any
right on behalf of the juvenile.
(c) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of question-
ing pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not wish to be ques-
tioned further, the officer shall cease questioning.
(d) Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting from custo-
dial interrogation, the court shall find that the juvenile knowingly, will-
ingly, and understandingly waived the juvenile’s rights.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2015).
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The J.D.B. and Fare cases thus reveal two levels of totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry: (1) whether a suspect is in custody as a predi-
cate for Miranda applicability, and (2) whether Miranda rights have
been waived. The following discussion will reveal a largely incoherent
body of case law demonstrating that lower courts inconsistently apply
the totality of circumstances test in determining whether students are
in Miranda custody when interrogated at school.
B. Lower Court Cases
1. Interrogations Solely by School Officials
As one commentator notes, “one can argue strongly that courts
should consider a school official’s questioning of a student about crimi-
nal misconduct to be ‘custodial’ interrogation, particularly when the
student is questioned in the principal’s office and feels that his or her
freedom to leave at will has been curtailed.”80 The courts have, never-
theless, routinely rejected such arguments. D.Z. v. State81 provides an
example. Officials suspected seventeen-year-old student D.Z. of defac-
ing the walls of a school restroom with sexual graffiti.82 Assistant
Principal Dowler accused D.Z. of the offense after calling D.Z. into his
office for a closed-door discussion.83 Without receiving Miranda warn-
ings, D.Z. immediately responded to Dowler’s accusation by confess-
ing.84 Dowler then relayed the confession to officer Flynn, a school
SRO, who went into Dowler’s office to talk to D.Z. who again con-
80. Robert J. Goodwin, The Fifth Amendment in Public Schools: A Rationale for Its
Application in Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings, 28 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 683, 706 n.115 (1987). For a rare case finding custodial interrogation where
a school official was the sole interrogator, see State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634
(N.H. 2001); accord D.Z. v. State, 96 N.E.3d 595, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), va-
cated, 100 N.E.3d 246 (Ind. 2018). In finding that a student, D.Z., was in custody
when questioned by assistant principal, Dowler, the Indiana Court of Appeals
observed:
The assistant principal questioned D.Z. in his office with the door closed.
No reasonable student would have believed that he was at liberty to
leave the office—it is undeniable that juveniles are susceptible to the
influence of authority figures and the constraining effect of being in a
controlled setting of a school, where “disobedience [can be] cause for dis-
ciplinary action.” As such, the circumstances of a school setting—where
a refusal to comply with the request or command of school officials can
have far-reaching consequences, including potential criminal charges—
have become inherently more coercive recently than ever before in the
past.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
564 U.S. 261, 276 (2011)). The case overruling the court of appeals’ opinion in
D.Z. is discussed in subsection III.B.i.
81. 100 N.E.3d 246.
82. Id. at 247.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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fessed.85 The school suspended D.Z. for five days, and the court adju-
dicated D.Z. as a delinquent for committing criminal mischief.86 At no
point did D.Z. receive Miranda warnings.87
On appeal, D.Z. argued that the school and SRO subjected him to
custodial interrogation without receiving Miranda warnings. The In-
diana Supreme Court rejected D.Z.’s argument finding that “when
school officials alone meet with students, a clear rule governs: Mi-
randa warnings are not required.”88 When police officers are not pre-
sent, this clear rule applies “unless school officials are acting as agents
of the police.”89
The court focused on the intent of the interrogation in finding that
Dowler was not acting as a police agent. When Dowler shared D.Z.’s
confession with Flynn, “the focus was not on criminal charges but on
finding out who was doing the graffiti.”90 Nor did an agency relation-
ship exist. Dowler’s interrogation was not a “pretextual priming” for
Flynn’s subsequent law enforcement questioning.91
Relying on Perkins,92 the D.Z. court speculated that even if Dowler
had been acting as a police agent, the interrogation would have re-
mained non-custodial if D.Z. was unaware of the agency relationship.
Since Miranda custody and its attendant coercion “ ‘is determined
from the perspective of the suspect,’ an agency relationship implicates
Miranda only if the suspect is aware enough of the underlying police
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 248 (citing B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225 (Ind. 2018)); accord People v.
Pankhurst, 848 N.E.2d 628, 633–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); State ex rel. A.J., 2014-
0595 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14); 151 So. 3d 659, 667; Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791
N.E.2d 894, 901 (Mass. 2003). When determining whether a school official is act-
ing as an “agent” of the police, one court observed:
The term “agency” denotes a consensual relationship which exists be-
tween two persons or parties where one of them is acting for or on behalf
of the other. “The law does not, however, presume an agency relation-
ship.” “The person alleging such a relationship has the burden of proving
it.” In determining whether this burden of proof has been satisfied,
“courts must examine the entire record.” Factors to consider in the anal-
ysis include whether the police were present during the interview;
whether the police provided instructions to the interviewer on what
questions to ask; whether the questions asked by the interviewer were
“aimed at gaining information and evidence for a criminal prosecution”
or were “related to some other goal”; and whether the defendant believed
that he was speaking with a law-enforcement agent during the
interview.
In re C.R.M., No. 03-14-00814-CV, 2016 WL 4272115, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 10,
2016) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 529–31
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
90. D.Z., 100 N.E.3d at 249.
91. Id.
92. 496 U.S. 292 (1990); supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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involvement to create a ‘coercive atmosphere.’”93 A coercive atmos-
phere is absent when a “suspect ‘speaks freely to someone whom he
believes is not [a police] officer.’”94 This was true of D.Z., who had no
knowledge that Dowler had talked to Flynn.
Such reliance on Perkins is not totally convincing. The suspect in
Perkins had no idea that he was speaking to a government official
when he spoke with the undercover police officer posing as a fellow
inmate.95 On the other hand, when he spoke with Dowler, D.Z. clearly
knew he was speaking to an authoritative figure with the power to
discipline him. Arguably, D.Z. also knew that any incriminating state-
ment made to Dowler would likely be turned over to the police.96 It is
difficult to see why the situation would be more “custodial” if Flynn
rather than Dowler had interrogated D.Z. From a reasonable student’s
perspective, there is little reason to believe the student would feel
more able and free to terminate the interrogation and leave the princi-
pal’s office when the principal is the interrogator rather than an
SRO.97
Nevertheless, the D.Z. court is correct in stating that the rule is
clear: interrogations conducted solely by school officials are not custo-
dial.98 The courts resolve the cases simply by identifying the interro-
93. D.Z., 100 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 292). For a case holding
that an agency relationship between the police and school officials is sufficient to
trigger the requirement to give Miranda warnings, even though a school official
solely conducts an interrogation and the student is unaware that the official is
acting as an agent of the police, see State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634 (N.H. 2001).
In Heirtzler, the court observed:
If school officials agree to take on the mantle of criminal investigation
and enforcement, however, they assume an understanding of constitu-
tional criminal law equal to that of a law enforcement officer. In such
circumstances, even if school officials claim their actions fall within the
ambit of their administrative authority, they should be charged with
abiding by the constitutional protections required in criminal
investigations.
Id. at 640.
94. D.Z., 100 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 717 (Ind.
2007)).
95. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
96. In the words of one court, “Even if there was evidence in the record that the
school’s policy was to provide information in its possession to the police, that
alone is insufficient to transform school officials into agents of the police.” Com-
monwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Mass. 2003). “[M]odern laws require
the reporting of certain types of criminal activity to law enforcement.” North,
supra note 47, at 470.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 69.
98. See, e.g., In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25, 33 (Tex. App. 2001). In In re V.P., the SRO
removed the student from class, briefly questioned him, took him to an assistant
principal’s office, and left while the assistant principal questioned the student.
The court stated: “Even assuming [the student] was in custody as he walked with
[the SRO] from his classroom to [the] office . . . [the student] was no longer in
custody as [the assistant principal] questioned him.” Id.
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gator. If there is no law enforcement involvement, then there is no
custody and no Miranda applicability.
Educational policy concerns are reflected in the “clear rule.” In per-
forming their “custodial and tutelary” functions,99 the Supreme Court
has granted schools broad authority to take measures to assure a safe
and orderly educational environment with minimal oversight from the
courts.100 As the court in Commonwealth v. Ira I.101 put the matter:
A trip to the principal’s office for an interview is not a “formal arrest,” nor does
it suggest to the student that he or she faces such an arrest. It is unrealistic to
expect school officials who are responsible for addressing student behavioral
issues to refrain from investigating allegations of students’ harming each
other, and the mere fact that such officials are in positions of authority over
students does not transform every interview of a student into a custodial
interrogation.102
The Ira I. court based its decision on the fact that interrogations by
school authorities are per se non-custodial. Nevertheless, the court, in
dicta, outlined factors relevant in cases where SROs or police officers
are involved in school interrogations.103
99. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
100. For discussion of limited Fourth Amendment protection of students, see generally
Gardner, supra note 43. Similarly, in the First Amendment context, the Supreme
Court has recognized that school students have minimal free speech rights.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that school could
discipline student for giving sexually implicit speech during a school assembly).
In discussing Fraser, a leading commentator observed: “It was appropriate for the
school to disassociate itself from Fraser’s actions by punishing him for the lewd
speech. Significantly, the Court recognized that children in school have First
Amendment rights, but indicated that these rights are less extensive than those
of adults in public places.” SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW
48 (2011).
101. 791 N.E.2d 894.
102. Id. at 902.
103. The court stated:
In determining whether there was custodial interrogation we look at
“how a reasonable person in the juvenile’s position would have under-
stood his situation.” The court considers the following factors: where the
interrogation took place; “whether the officers have conveyed to the per-
son being questioned any belief or opinion that the person is a suspect”;
the tone and nature of the questioning; and “whether, at the time the
incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the inter-
view by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interroga-
tor to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an
arrest.”
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 521 N.E.2d
1368, 1370 (Mass. 1988); then quoting Commonwealth v. Brum, 777 N.E.2d 1238,
1246–47 (Mass. 2002)).
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2. SRO Involvement in Interrogations by School Officials
While a clear rule exists for interrogations solely by school officials,
involvement of SROs104 results in a decidedly unclear picture across
jurisdictions. Some courts find that SRO participation triggers the re-
quirement to give Miranda warnings105 while others, as will be
shown, find interrogations to be non-custodial when SROs are
involved.
a. Miranda Warnings Required
In N.C. v. Commonwealth,106 the Kentucky Supreme Court ad-
dressed a situation where an assistant principal and the SRO took a
student (N.C.) out of class to the assistant principal’s office. After clos-
ing the office door, the assistant principal asked N.C. if he knew why
they had brought N.C. to the office.107 N.C. said he did not know.108
The assistant principal informed N.C., with the SRO observing, that
they had received information that N.C. had given away hydrocodone
pills at school.109 N.C. immediately confessed to distributing the
pills.110 The assistant principal then informed N.C. that he was sub-
ject to school discipline.111
104. SROs are certified law enforcement officers, usually employed by a school dis-
trict, who serve under the direction of the school principal. See Peter Price, When
Is a Police Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police Officers in Schools,
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 561–63 (2009) (providing a sample of jurisdic-
tions declaring SROs as school employees). Some SROs are employed by law en-
forcement agencies and assigned by such agencies to a particular school on either
a permanent or rotating basis. See, e.g., N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852,
867–68 (Ky. 2013) (Cunningham, J., dissenting). SROs can function in three
roles: teacher, counselor, and law enforcement agent. Holland, supra note 5, at
74–75. Some schools embrace all three roles for their SROs, while in others, one
role dominates. Id. at 75–76.
105. See, e.g., B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225 (Ind. 2018) (finding Miranda applicable
when three SROs were present while vice principal led fifteen-minute interroga-
tion of thirteen-year-old student who confessed to making a bomb threat). In
B.A., the court found the situation to be “police overshadowed,” as evidenced by
officers being situated between the student and the door of the vice-principal’s
office where the interrogation took place. Id. at 233–34. Moreover, the officers
were strangers to the student. Id. at 233. Finally, taking into consideration the
Supreme Court’s requirement in J.D.B., that the age of the student be factored
into the custody analysis, the B.A. court concluded: “The officers were aware,
though, that B.A. was a young middle-schooler. So they knew that a reasonable
person in B.A.’s shoes would be ‘more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside
pressures’ than would adults or older teenagers.” Id. at 233–34 (quoting J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011)).
106. 396 S.W.3d 852.
107. Id. at 854.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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After receiving the confession, the assistant principal asked N.C.
how many pills he had brought to school.112 When told that three pills
were brought, the assistant principal left the office to attempt to se-
cure the pills.113 The SRO, armed with a gun and wearing clothing
identifying him with the “Sheriff’s Office,” then informed N.C. that he
would be charged with a crime.114 N.C. was subsequently expelled
from school.115 He pled guilty in criminal court to possessing and dis-
pensing a controlled substance, a class D felony, for which he was sen-
tenced to forty-five days in jail and thirty hours of community
service.116
The N.C. court concluded that N.C. had been subjected to custodial
interrogation without receiving Miranda warnings, thereby rendering
his confession inadmissible in the criminal court proceedings.117 The
court was concerned that the assistant principal and the SRO had a
“loose routine” they followed when questioning students.118 The assis-
tant principal, with knowledge of “how the SRO operated in criminal
investigations,” would question the student.119 If the assistant princi-
pal received a confession admitting commission of a crime, the SRO,
who was passively observing, would then inform the student of future
actions the SRO would take against him and issue a citation on the
spot.120 The fact that the assistant principal was acting “in concert”
with the SRO was sufficient to characterize the situation as “law en-
forcement” questioning, bringing Miranda into play.121 In applying
the Supreme Court’s J.D.B. rubric,122 the court found the instant in-
terrogation custodial, thus triggering the necessity for Miranda
warnings:
The facts of this case demonstrate that Appellant was in custody under the
“all relevant factors” test set forth in J.D.B. He was taken from his classroom
by a law enforcement officer, who was clearly identified as such, and who wore
a gun. He was seated in the assistant principal’s office, and the door was shut.
The law enforcement officer sat down right beside him, across from the assis-
tant principal. The assistant principal testified that he expected Appellant to
stay put, which was no doubt conveyed by his demeanor.
Neither the officer nor the assistant principal told N.C. that he was free to
leave. . . . He was initially questioned by the assistant principal instead of the
officer, thereby leading him to believe this was only a school discipline
matter. . . .
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 854–55.
117. Id. at 863–65.
118. Id. at 854.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 855.
121. Id. at 863.
122. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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. . . It was not until the questioning was over and the confession made that
the law enforcement officer told N.C. that he was placing felony criminal
charges against him.
The assistant principal admitted that this was a process that he and the
officer had done in tandem several times before.123
. . . .
. . . Because the assistant principal was acting in concert with the SRO,
and they had established a process for cases involving interrogations of this
kind, this conduct and the SRO’s presence make this state action by law en-
forcement for Miranda purposes . . . even if the confession came in response to
questions from the assistant principal rather than the SRO.124
The court granted that the assistant principal and the SRO carried
out “a necessary function” in removing “a highly addictive narcotic”
from the school.125 “But when [N.C.] was questioned with more than
school discipline in mind, there was a confluence of the student’s
rights and the needs of the school. This is more than mere school disci-
pline situations which do not involve criminal activity.”126 The motive
of the interrogator and the possible consequences of a confession
emerging from the interrogation were thus the relevant, albeit inap-
propriate, factors the N.C. court used when determining the custody
issue.127
While the SRO involvement in N.C. was virtually non-existent,
other courts have found interrogations to be custodial when SROs
played a more dominant role.128 On the other hand, as discussed im-
mediately below, courts have also found interrogations to be non-cus-
todial where significant SRO participation occurred.
b. Miranda Warnings Not Required
A recent California case, People v. Kay,129 presents an interesting
contrast to the N.C. case. The school principal, Jordan, called a stu-
dent, Kay, into his office for questioning, suspecting Kay was involved
in an off-campus pellet gun shooting of two fellow students. Two other
school administrators were present along with Officer Jenkins, a city
police officer assigned as the school SRO who was in full police uni-
form with a duty belt that included a firearm.130 Jordan sat at his
desk with Kay seated facing him while Jenkins and the two other
123. N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 862.
124. Id. at 863.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Such analysis is seriously at odds with Miranda doctrine, which defines custody
in terms of the perceptions of a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation, see
supra notes 37–38, 63 and accompanying text, rather than in light of the intent or
motives of the interrogators. The state of mind of the interrogator is decidedly
irrelevant.
128. See supra note 105.
129. No. A145381, 2018 WL 636215 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).
130. Id. at *3–4.
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school administrators sat at a table behind Kay.131 Jordan began the
interview by informing Kay that he (Jordan) believed Kay had shot
the two students based on tips received from students.132 Kay imme-
diately admitted shooting the students.133 Jordan requested a written
statement to be used as evidence in possible future expulsion proceed-
ings.134 Jenkins then briefly questioned Kay, placed him under arrest,
and handcuffed him.135 With his confession used as evidence, the
court subsequently convicted Kay of misdemeanor assault for “shoot-
ing a BB device in a grossly negligent manner.”136
The court found that Kay had not been subjected to custodial inter-
rogation, emphasizing that Jordan was not acting as Jenkins’s agent
even though Jenkins purposely remained passive during the interro-
gation in hopes of obtaining a confession which could be used in crimi-
nal proceedings.137 Jenkins and Jordan had a prior understanding
that Jordan would lead the interrogation. Jenkins told Jordan before
the questioning that Jordan should “ask the questions and the ques-
tioning ‘would be from the school, not from law enforcement.’”138
Notwithstanding the cooperation between Jordan and Jenkins, the
court found that the school and the police were involved in “ ‘parallel
investigation[s]’ . . . with the school interested in ‘bringing normalcy
back to the school’ and the police interested in the ‘criminal aspect of
it.’ ”139 As in the N.C. case above, the Kay court saw the motive of the
interrogator and the possible consequences of the interrogation as the
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *5. Prior to sitting in on the questioning of Kay, Jenkins had consulted with
Detective Harpham, a fellow member of the police department. Id. at *4. The
court explained:
Detective Harpham testified [at Kay’s trial] that he was the lead investi-
gator on the shooting. Before Principal Jordan interviewed Kay about
the shooting, Harpham told Officer Jenkins to “let the school do what
they have to do” regarding questioning Kay. He told Jenkins “to be a fly
on the wall” during the interview and “to only involve himself if there’s a
confession, only to involve himself then after . . . a Miranda
[admonishment].”
The defense attorney asked Harpham whether he believed a Miranda
advisement would be required if Jenkins asked questions of Kay. He re-
sponded, “Yeah, clearly. I was uncomfortable with that—with that tak-
ing place, yes.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *6 (alternation in original).
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relevant factors in determining whether or not the interrogation was
custodial.140
c. Critique of the Agency Approach
The N.C. and Kay cases are indistinguishable. The “loose routine”
establishing police/school agency in N.C. seems every bit as present in
Kay, where the court found there was no such agency relationship.141
Even if courts consistently identified the presence of school/police
agency relationships, the focus on such is misguided, especially in
cases like N.C. and Kay, where the courts are indifferent to whether or
not the interrogated student is aware of the agency relationship.142 If
the student is unaware of a school/police agency relationship, this re-
lationship cannot add to the coerciveness of the interrogation situa-
tion given that Miranda custody is determined from the perspective of
the student.143
It is difficult to see why the interrogation necessarily becomes “cus-
todial” if the student is aware that an interrogating school official is
acting as an agent of the police. It would not be custodial if the student
knows that the school official is acting independently of an SRO. The
SRO will gain access to a confession in either case by being present
during the student’s interrogation, as evidenced in N.C. and Kay. The
140. In In re R.B.L., 776 S.E.2d 363 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), the court determined
whether a joint principal/SRO interrogation of a student sufficiently met the “law
enforcement” requirement necessary to trigger Miranda applicability. As in the
D.Z. and Kay cases, school officials dominated the interrogation, with the SRO
merely observing and asking only a few questions. The court concluded:
Although Richard [the student] emphasizes voir dire testimony from
Principal Stephans about how school administrators are required to re-
port drug offenses to the police and consequently SRO Hayes routinely
assists in related investigations including questioning sessions, the re-
cord here clearly demonstrates that SRO Hayes was minimally involved
in questioning Richard while Principal Stephans and Assistant Principal
Nebrig took charge and focused on potential violations of school rules
rather than collecting evidence for a criminal prosecution. We therefore
conclude that . . . Richard was not in custody for Miranda purposes.
Id. at *8.
141. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
142. For a definition of agency which considers whether students are aware that they
are speaking to a law enforcement officer, see supra note 89. However, courts
routinely decide cases on the basis of a police/school agency relationship without
requiring that the interrogated student be aware of the agency. See, e.g., People
v. Pankhurst, 848 N.E.2d 628, 633–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); State ex rel. A.J., 2014-
0595 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14); 151 So. 3d 659, 667 (“there is no bright line rule for
determining whether one is acting as an agent of law enforcement”). For a rare
case recognizing student awareness of an agency relationship as relevant in de-
termining whether or not an interrogation by a school official is custodial, see In
re C.R.M., No. 03-14-00814-CV, 2016 WL 4272115, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 10,
2016).
143. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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situation is not different if the interviewing school official is an agent
of the police and the student is aware of the agency. The interviewer is
still the school official, a person likely familiar to the student. That the
goal of the interrogation is to gather evidence of both a school rule and
a criminal law violation would not necessarily add to the student’s
perception of whether or not she was in custody. After all, school offi-
cials are obligated to turn over incriminating evidence to the police
when acting solely as school officials. A “reasonable student” may be
aware of this obligation.144 If so, the motivation of the interrogator to
gather criminal evidence is irrelevant.145
The judicial focus on the presence or absence of an agency relation-
ship between school officials and police is decidedly unhelpful and
should be abandoned in determining custodial interrogation. The
presence of school/police agency is the primary basis for those courts
who find interrogations dominated by school officials to be custodial.
Eliminating agency inquiries would mean that such interrogations are
non-custodial, thus rendering Miranda inapplicable.
A possible objection to this conclusion is that it allows the police to
purposely orchestrate school interrogations, as in N.C. and Kay, to ob-
tain confessions without requiring Miranda warnings.146 While such
a situation may suggest inappropriate behavior contrary to the spirit
of Miranda, it is in fact constitutionally permissible. The police use of
an undercover agent in Perkins constituted an attempt to circumvent
the requirement to give Miranda warnings to a suspect but was never-
144. See supra note 103.
145. As understood by at least some courts, N.C. and Kay for example, the presence of
an agency relationship is defined by the motive behind the interrogation (school
or law enforcement purposes) rather than the student’s perception of custody.
Such a view is praised by some, as evidenced by the following proposed test for
determining the requirement for Miranda warnings when non-law enforcement
interrogators question students:
[W]hen non-law enforcement actors are collecting evidence with the in-
tent to assist law enforcement, constitutional rights are implicated and
constitutional warnings are necessary to prevent any violations of these
rights. To help determine the intent of the actor, courts consider two
factors: whether the evidence collected is turned over to police for crimi-
nal sanctions or only used for internal sanctions, and whether the actors
had a general crime control motive when they acted (an ultimate or im-
mediate goal analysis).
Eleftheria Keans, Note, Student Interrogations by School Officials: Out with
Agency Law and in with Constitutional Warnings, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 375,
383 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Meg Penrose, Miranda, Please Report to
the Principal’s Office, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 775, 785 (2006) (“Where the purpose
of the interview, even remotely, is to elicit evidence intended for use in criminal
proceedings, the dynamic of the exchange transforms immediately into a setting
where the Fifth Amendment and its full protections should be afforded and
honored.”).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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theless permissible.147 Similarly, in the context of waiver of Miranda
rights, the United States Supreme Court has held it permissible for
the police to purposely fail to inform a suspect being held in custody
that a lawyer was seeking to consult him in order to increase the like-
lihood of obtaining a confession from the suspect.148 The Court rea-
soned that “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capac-
ity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”149
By the same token, such events can have no bearing on whether a
reasonable student would feel that they were in custody.
Eliminating Miranda from interrogations by school officials would
not mean that all confessions given by students to a school official
would necessarily be admissible. Confessions would still be required to
be “voluntary” under traditional due process coerced confession doc-
trine with the age of the student being part of the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances inquiry.
3. Interrogations Dominated by SROs with School Officials
Present
There is little case law addressing situations where SROs conduct
interrogations while school officials act as relatively passive observ-
ers. The few reported cases reflect the view that even though the stu-
dent is aware that she is being interrogated by a law enforcement
officer, often for purposes of investigating criminal activity, the inter-
rogation is not necessarily custodial. Some cases require Miranda
warnings while others do not depending on the perceived underlying
coerciveness of the circumstances.
In R.D.S. v. State,150 Vice Principal Brown and an SRO, Deputy
Lambert, suspected a student, R.D.S., of possessing illegal drugs in
his truck parked in the school parking lot.151 Lambert and Brown
found R.D.S. in the school commons area.152 Lambert had decided to
search R.D.S.’s truck and requested R.D.S. accompany her and Brown
to the parking lot.153 R.D.S. agreed, and while the three were walking
to the parking lot, Lambert twice asked R.D.S. if there was anything
147. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
148. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
149. Id. at 422. In Moran, the police not only failed to inform the suspect of the law-
yer’s attempts to consult with him but also falsely told the lawyer that they
would not be interrogating the suspect. Id. at 417. Although “highly inappropri-
ate,” such deception “could not possibly affect a suspect’s decision to waive his
Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of the incident.” Id. at 423.
150. 245 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2008).
151. Id. at 360.
152. Id.
153. Id.
38 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:16
in his truck that should not be there.154 R.D.S. twice answered no.155
Lambert opened the unlocked truck door and discovered a plastic bag
containing marijuana.156 Lambert asked R.D.S. where he had been
that morning, and R.D.S. confessed to leaving school and smoking ma-
rijuana.157 R.D.S. remained at school pending a special education
hearing after which Lambert took R.D.S. to a juvenile detention
center.158 After failing to have his incriminating statements sup-
pressed for want of Miranda warnings, the court found R.D.S. delin-
quent for violating drug laws.159
The Tennessee Supreme Court found that R.D.S. was not in cus-
tody when he made the incriminating statements, thus eliminating
the need for Miranda warnings.160 The court listed numerous factors
relevant in determining the custody issue.161 Ultimately, the court
concluded that despite R.D.S.’s claim that Lambert had commanded
him to accompany her to the parking lot, Lambert had merely re-
quested that he go with her since it was his truck that would be
searched.162 Under such circumstances, “a reasonable person in
[R.D.S.’s] circumstances would not have considered his freedom lim-
ited to the degree [necessary to constitute being held in custody].”163
In contrast to R.D.S., a Florida court, in State v. J.H., found Mi-
randa warnings necessary.164 An SRO informed the school dean of his
suspicion that a student, J.H., possessed marijuana. The dean asked
J.H. to step out of class whereupon the SRO “asked J.H. if he had
anything improper on him.”165 In response, J.H. reached into his
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 360–62.
157. Id. at 361.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The court considered a variety of factors, including the following:
[T]he time and location of the interrogation; the duration and character
of the questioning; the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; the
suspect’s method of transportation to the place of questioning; the num-
ber of police officers present; any limitation on movement or other form
of restraint imposed on the suspect during the interrogation; any inter-
actions between the officer and the suspect, including the words spoken
by the officer to the suspect, and the suspect’s verbal or nonverbal re-
sponses; the extent to which the suspect is confronted with the law en-
forcement officer’s suspicions of guilt or evidence of guilt; and finally, the
extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to re-
frain from answering questions or to end the interview at will.
Id. at 364 (quoting State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 898 So. 2d 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id. at 240.
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pocket and handed the officer a quantity of marijuana.166 In a subse-
quent delinquency proceeding, J.H. moved to suppress the marijuana
as the fruit of a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.167
The trial court agreed that J.H. had been subjected to custodial inter-
rogation as did the J.H. court on appeal.168
There is little to distinguish the R.D.S. and J.H. cases. Why was
J.H. in custody when asked a single question by a SRO in a school
hallway, but R.D.S. was not in custody when a SRO twice asked him
incriminating questions while walking to a parking lot?
4. Police Dominated Interrogations
It might appear that courts would readily find school interroga-
tions dominated by local police (non-SROs) to be custodial given that
the interrogation obviously concerns a law enforcement matter rather
than a mere breach of a school rule. Reasonable students in such cir-
cumstances, whatever their age, would seemingly not feel “at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave”169 unless explicitly informed
of such freedom. Yet in J.D.B., where a local police officer not associ-
ated with the school caused the student to be taken from class to a
conference room, the Court remanded the case for a lower court deter-
mination of custody.170 The officer interrogated the student for up to
forty-five minutes, informing him that the matter was “going to court”
with the possibility of the student being held in pre-adjudication de-
tention.171 If such a situation is not custodial, it is hard to see what
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 241. The J.H. court found, however, that even though the trial court “may
well have been correct” in concluding that J.H. was in custody, the marijuana
was nevertheless admissible as it “would have been discovered inevitably without
interrogation.” Id. Similarly, an Oregon court held that a junior high student was
subjected to custodial interrogation when the school principal summoned the stu-
dent to his office and a uniformed police officer questioned the student in the
presence of the school official. In re Killitz, 651 P.2d 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). The
court based its custody conclusion on the fact that the interrogation took place at
school where the student’s “movements were controlled to a great extent by
school personnel” and his interrogation was by a “uniformed police officer” who
“did [nothing] to dispel the clear impression . . . that [the student] was not free to
leave.” Id. at 1383–84. Moreover, the student was aware that he was being ques-
tioned as a suspect of a crime and “[h]e would likely have been subject to the
usual school disciplinary procedures had he not complied with the principal’s re-
quest that he come to the office.” Id. at 1384.
169. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keo-
hane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
170. Id. at 281.
171. Id. at 265–66.
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would be custodial short of physically restraining the student from
leaving the room.172
Unsurprisingly, some courts have found interrogations custodial
where local police (non-SROs) interrogate students at school. In State
v. D.R., a plainclothes police officer, Detective Matney, interrogated
fourteen-year-old student, D.R., in the principal’s office, suspecting
D.R. of committing incest with his sister.173 Matney showed D.R. his
badge but told the student he was not required to answer ques-
tions.174 Matney then told D.R., “We know you’ve been havin’ sexual
intercourse with your sister.”175 D.R. subsequently confessed.
In finding that the confession should have been suppressed in
D.R.’s eventual trial, the court noted: “We . . . conclude that D.R. was
in custody, in light of Detective Matney’s failure to inform him he was
free to leave, D.R.’s youth, the naturally coercive nature of the school
and principal’s office environment for children of his age, and the obvi-
ously accusatory nature of the interrogation.”176
As with the other scenarios discussed above, the courts in police
dominated school interrogations reach seemingly inconsistent conclu-
sions. It is puzzling that the student in D.R. was deemed to be in cus-
tody while J.D.B. was not, at least in the eyes of the lower courts
deciding the case before it reached the Supreme Court.
There is little doubt that the case law deciding the custody issue in
school interrogations is incoherent and manifests a failure of the
J.D.B. Court’s promise to provide an “objective custody test . . .  ‘de-
signed to give clear guidance’” to those deciding whether or not Mi-
randa warnings are required.177 Given this chaotic situation, I will
suggest a way forward in Part V. Any such recommendation should,
however, be informed by the relevant social science addressing juve-
172. For a case of police dominated interrogation held not to be custodial, see State v.
Polanco, 658 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Two North Miami detectives
in plain clothes requested school officials to bring student Polanco from class to a
conference room for interrogation. Id. at 1123–24. With no school officials pre-
sent, the detectives informed Polanco that they were conducting an investigation
and that his name had come to their attention. Id. at 1125. The interrogation
focused entirely on the question of Polanco’s whereabouts on the night of the
homicide they were investigating without informing Polanco of the nature of the
investigation. Id. The Polanco court does not reveal the length of the interroga-
tion, but it led to the detectives requesting that Polanco accompany them to a
nearby police station where Polanco subsequently confessed to the murder. Id. at
1124. The court found “no basis on which to rule that [Polanco] was in custody for
Miranda purposes during the school interview.” Id. at 1125.
173. 930 P.2d 350, 351–52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 352.
176. Id. at 353.
177. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 279 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alva-
rado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)).
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nile interrogations. The following section attends to the research in
this area.
IV. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS
As noted above in the discussion of the J.D.B. case, the Supreme
Court has relied on empirical studies demonstrating ways that differ-
ences between young people and adults may impact juvenile interro-
gation law.178 The discussion hereafter will pay special attention to a
body of research specifically addressing the effectiveness of Miranda
warnings when presented to young people as well as data identifying
interrogations that create a risk of false confessions. It must be noted
that the existing body of social science research does not address the
dynamics of school interrogations. That context presents “virtually
uncharted research territory.”179
A. Neurological Differences Between Adolescents and
Adults
Neuroscience researchers consistently find that adolescents make
decisions differently than adults.180 These differences are partly
caused by developmental changes occurring during adolescence.181
“During adolescence, the brain is not actually growing, but rather
changing in subtle but important ways.”182 Sections of the brain ma-
ture at different rates which results in uneven functioning.183 This
means that parts of the brain may function at an adult level while
other parts of the brain are not yet fully developed.184 Notably, the
frontal lobe, “which regulates decision-making, planning, judgement,
and impulse control,” is the last section of the brain to develop in the
178. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
179. Hayley M. D. Cleary, Applying the Lessons of Developmental Psychology to the
Study of Juvenile Interrogations: New Directions for Research, Policy, and Prac-
tice, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 118, 125 (2017).
180. See generally Naomi E. S. Goldstein et al., Waving Good-Bye to Waiver: A Devel-
opmental Argument Against Youths’ Waiver of Miranda Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (2018).
181. Id.
182. Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on
Constitutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 3, 8 (2006) [hereinafter Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making].
183. Lily N. Katz, Tailoring Entrapment to the Adolescent Mind, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL’Y 94, 133 (2014).
184. Id. at 133–34. For a detailed description of juveniles’ development, see Khushboo
Shah, What’s in an Age? Consider the Neuroscience Dimension of Juvenile Law,
26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 171–76 (2016) (noting the back to front develop-
ment of the brain, specific neurological systems affected, and how juvenile
thought processes and behaviors differ compared to those of fully-developed
adults).
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late teens.185 These functions permit abstract reasoning, which is par-
ticularly important to comprehension of Miranda rights as later
discussed.186
Dopamine production also significantly shifts during adolescence,
causing risky behavior.187 Adolescents are found to “value impulsiv-
ity, fun-seeking, and peer approval more than adults.”188 This finding
is affirmed by the fact that incidents caused by risk-taking behavior,
such as accidental drownings and driver deaths, most frequently occur
during adolescence.189 Cognitive abilities fully develop by approxi-
mately age sixteen, at which time adolescents become “quite capable
of making mature, rational decisions.”190 However, psychosocial ma-
turity continues to develop after age sixteen.191
The perception of a given risk, not solely the knowledge of the exis-
tence of the risk, is what differentiates adolescents from adults.192
Some adolescents may be able to identify and weigh risks under nor-
mal daily conditions but most struggle with assessing risks when they
are emotionally charged.193 When adolescents are emotionally
charged, they tend to focus less on negative consequences and more on
potential rewards than do adults.194 This is because neurological and
chemical changes cause juveniles to be less future-oriented and focus
on immediate rewards.195 “[J]uveniles respond to situations ‘more
185. Albert G. Mendoza, Comment, “Do You Understand These Rights?” A Juvenile
Perspective of Miranda, 49 MCGEORGE L. REV. 235, 244 (2017).
186. Sara Cressey, Overawed and Overwhelmed: Juvenile Miranda Incomprehension,
70 ME. L. REV. 87, 98 (2017).
187. Mendoza, supra note 185.
188. Katz, supra note 183, at 134 (quoting Brief for American Psychological Ass’n and
Missouri Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447, at 7).
189. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., How Developmental Science Influences Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform, 8 UC IRVINE L. REV. 21, 26 (2018).
190. Id. at 23.
191. Psychosocial maturity involves “more complex processes such as responsibility
(e.g., susceptibility to peer influence), perspective (e.g., placing one’s actions in the
broader social and temporal contexts), and temperance (e.g., suppressing impul-
sive behavior and thinking before acting).” Id. Literature tends to define the key
differences between adolescents and adults in the following areas: “how much
they consider the consequences of their actions, how sensitive they are to re-
wards, how susceptible they are to peer influence, and how much they are able to
regulate their impulsive behavior.” Id. Thus, both a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old
and an adult can identify risks—the difference is in how they weigh those risks.
Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making, supra note 182, at 9.
192. Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making, supra note 182, at 9.
193. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 22.
194. Id. at 23–24.
195. Jennifer Alberts, Interrogation of Juveniles: Are Parents the Best Defenders of
Juveniles’ Right to Remain Silent?, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 109, 112–13 (2016).
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strongly with gut response than they do with evaluating the conse-
quences of what they’re doing.’”196
MRI studies verify that juveniles are less able to perceive emo-
tional cues from others.197 Researchers studying juvenile and adult
interpretation of facial expressions found that all of the adult partici-
pants were able to identify the expression of fear.198 However, many
teenagers were unable to do so.199 Teenagers relied on their limbic
system instead of their prefrontal cortex in this exercise.200 Thus,
juveniles are likely to make poor decisions when peers are present,
when the stakes are high, and when they must make a decision at
that precise moment.201
B. Miranda Comprehension
Dr. Thomas Grisso published a study in 1980 on juveniles’ capaci-
ties related to Miranda warnings.202 Grisso found that juveniles have
a weak understanding of their Miranda rights.203 The study more spe-
cifically found that “younger age, lower intelligence, lower academic
achievement, lower socioeconomic status, and greater interrogative
suggestibility predict poorer Miranda comprehension, with large
numbers of juveniles having inadequate comprehension of at least one
right.”204
While the degree of juvenile understanding may vary slightly from
study to study depending on the variables and definitions, overall
modern studies confirm Grisso’s findings.205 Grisso found that 33.2%
of juveniles understood the key words used in Miranda warnings com-
pared to 60.1% of adults.206 Grisso also found that juveniles commonly
misunderstood the word “interrogation” and believed they only had a
right to an attorney during a hearing.207
196. Id. at 111 (quoting Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Cul-
pability, A.B.A. JUV. JUST. CTR., Jan. 2004, at 2).
197. Id. at 111–12.
198. Id. at 111.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 112.
201. Cauffman et al., supra note 189, at 28–29.
202. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’
Capacities].
203. Id. at 1166.
204. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 31 (footnote omitted) (summarizing Grisso’s
findings that have prevailed over time). Among Grisso’s findings are that: “88% of
ten- and eleven-year-olds, 73% of twelve-year-olds, 65% of thirteen-year-olds, and
54% of fourteen-year-olds had inadequate comprehension of at least one Miranda
right.” Id. at 30 (citing Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities, supra note 202, at 1155).
205. Id. at 31.
206. Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities, supra note 202, at 1153–54.
207. Id.
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Word comprehension is only the starting point for understanding
Miranda rights.208 Juveniles must be able to appreciate and apply the
words to their current situation.209 Grisso and other researchers have
found that only 20.9% of juveniles adequately understand Miranda
rights compared to 42.3% of adults.210 Another study found that of
children age twelve to nineteen, 94% had “less than adequate appreci-
ation of the significance and consequences of waiving their rights.”211
Ninety-nine percent of those studied had a “less than adequate appre-
ciation” of the implications of waiving their right to remain silent.212
The following illustrates the comprehension issues:
Many youths believe that “You have the right to remain silent” means “You
have to remain silent,” or “You can’t talk until they tell you to.” Many believe
that “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law” means that
“If you swear you’ll be in big trouble,” or “You can’t dis the cops.” The notion of
an adult (let alone a police officer) telling a youth that he doesn’t have to talk
to the adult simply does not connect with anything else most youths experi-
ence at home or in school in their interactions with adults. So they often trans-
late these warnings into things that seem consistent to them regarding how
authority figures typically would respond to children.213
Studies also call into question juveniles’ ability to retain knowl-
edge of their rights if they engage in ongoing questioning. Of those age
thirteen to seventeen, only the most mature adolescents recall 50% of
the warnings after one minute of receiving them.214 Moreover,
juveniles routinely have inaccurate beliefs about the justice system
and the roles of police, attorneys, and judges.215 Many juveniles have
difficulty understanding that the police are not always on their side
and believe police do not lie.216 Juveniles also often believe attorneys
are required to disclose all their conversations with the judge.217
It is worth noting that these studies are typically conducted in con-
trolled situations, not the custodial interrogation setting; thus, it is
likely that juveniles are even less capable of understanding their Mi-
randa rights during an emotionally charged interrogation.218 Further,
208. Cressey, supra note 186, at 99.
209. Id.
210. Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities, supra note 202, at 1153.
211. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 31 (citing NAOMI E. S. GOLDSTEIN ET AL, MI-
RANDA RIGHTS COMPREHENSION INSTRUMENTS (MRCI) 93 (2014) [hereinafter
MRCI]).
212. Id. at 31–32 (citing MRCI, supra note 211, at 104).
213. Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making, supra note 182, at 10.
214. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 33.
215. E.g., Lauren Gottesman, Protecting Juveniles’ Rights to Remain Silent: Dangers
of the Thompkins Rule and Recommendations for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
2031, 2053 (2013).
216. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 38, 40.
217. Cressey, supra note 186, at 100.
218. Mendoza, supra note 185, at 250.
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there are up to 532 different versions of the Miranda warning.219
Juveniles in jurisdictions with complex Miranda wordings are even
less likely to grasp Miranda concepts.220
Those best equipped to reason through the Miranda warnings have
the ability to imagine different possible scenarios that could occur if
their Miranda rights are waived or not waived and understand the
consequences.221 Studies suggest “it may be physically impossible for
adolescents to engage in counterfactual reasoning” and “foresee the
possible consequences of their actions.”222 Overall, social science has
proven that delinquent juveniles are unlikely to understand their Mi-
randa rights when subject to a custodial interrogation.
C. Waiving Miranda Rights
For a variety of reasons, juveniles waive their Miranda rights more
often than adults. Studies consistently show that over 90% of youths
waive their rights compared to 60%–80% of adults.223 Reasons for the
high rate of juvenile waivers include the following: juveniles are
taught to tell the truth and to respond to authority figures,224 they
lack an understanding or ability to invoke Miranda rights effectively,
or they have less experience than adults with the justice system.225
Moreover, in an exhaustive study of sixteen- and seventeen-year-
old youths interrogated in Minnesota for felony offenses, Barry Feld
found that nearly 60% of the suspects confessed almost immediately.
Feld wrote, “[I]nterrogations were surprisingly brief, most youths con-
fessed or made admissions at the outset, and officers confronted
youths with any evidence in only half (54.4 percent of) the cases.”226
Further, “[a] majority (58.6 percent) of juveniles confessed within a
few minutes of waiving Miranda and did not require prompting by
police.”227
Feld’s study confirms studies done in the U.K., which found confes-
sions from juveniles were routinely obtained quickly with little if no
police persuasion:
219. Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 34.
220. Id.
221. Cressey, supra note 186, at 98.
222. Id. (quoting Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of Conse-
quential Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 245 (S.
Zeki & O. Goodenough eds., 2006)).
223. See e.g., Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops
Question Kids, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 12 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Real Interro-
gation]; Mendoza, supra note 185, at 251.
224. E.g., Gottesman, supra note 215, at 2062.
225. E.g., Feld, Real Interrogation, supra note 223, at 11–12.
226. Id. at 15.
227. Id. at 17.
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Research on British interrogations of juveniles reported that “[i]nterviews
tended to be very brief with the majority taking less than fifteen minutes (71.4
percent).” . . . Analyses of taped UK interrogations reported that “most were
short and surprisingly amiable discussions” in which more than one-third of
suspects confessed at the outset. . . . ” [T]he confession rate was 58 percent,
little interrogative pressure was applied, and very few suspects who initially
denied guilt eventually confessed.”228
D. Risk of False Confessions
There can be no doubt that false confessions are a blight on the
legal system. “False confessions and wrongful convictions are undeni-
able failures of the criminal justice system and deserve the public and
empirical attention they receive, for they cause irreparable harm to
wrongfully accused individuals and their families.”229 Fortunately,
current evidence suggests that only a “small but significant minority
of innocent people confess under interrogation.”230 However, as ob-
served by the Court in J.D.B., data suggests a heightened risk of false
confessions from youth.231
Juveniles are two to three times more likely than adults to falsely
confess.232 For the American population, false confessions cause ap-
proximately 14%–25% of all wrongful convictions.233 This percentage
increases to 44% for juveniles.234 It further increases to 75% among
the youngest juveniles ages twelve to fifteen.235 A study conducted by
Steven Drizin and Richard Leo on false confessions found that one-
third of their study sample consisted of juveniles.236 The majority of
juvenile false confessors in the study were ages fourteen to seventeen,
228. Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
229. Cleary, supra note 179, at 118.
230. Id. (quoting Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 5 (2010)).
231. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. There is no way to tell how often false
confessions occur or lead to wrongful convictions. Barry C. Feld, Police Interroga-
tion of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 219, 241 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Police Interrogations]. Through
DNA testing, the Innocence Project has found that “more than 1 out of 4 people
wrongfully convicted but later exonerated by DNA evidence made a false confes-
sion or incriminating statement.” Hana M. Sahdev, Juvenile Miranda Waivers
and Wrongful Convictions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1211, 1215 (2018) (quoting
False Confessions & Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/8NA5-F8QW] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)).
232. Ariel Spierer, The Right to Remain a Child: The Impermissibility of the Reid
Technique in Juvenile Interrogations, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1731 (2017).
233. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 902 (2004).
234. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 193,
204 (2008).
235. Id.
236. Drizin & Leo, supra note 233, at 944.
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which is the age range at which many juveniles may be tried as
adults.237
It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority, 81%, of false
confessions identified in the Drizin and Leo study occurred in murder
cases.238 Presumably, murder cases are where police apply their most
aggressive interrogation tactics.239 The majority of the remaining
false confessions occurred in the contexts of felony rape and arson.240
It is significant that the interrogations yielding false confessions
were lengthy. Only 16% lasted less than six hours, and some lasted up
237. Id. Several reasons explain the disproportionate rate of false juvenile confessions.
Both true and false confessions are generally the result of waiving Miranda
rights. Juveniles are more likely than adults to waive Miranda rights because of
the cognitive and developmental differences described above. See infra section
IV.C. Juveniles frequently waive Miranda rights under the belief that doing so
will allow them to “go home.” Spierer, supra note 232, at 1742. Juveniles are also
likely to comply with perceived requests from adult authority figures. See Chris-
tine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Devel-
opment and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 66 (2007). As
developmental psychologist Gerald Koocher stated: “Adults’ interactions with
children are often framed as requests, yet children are seldom fooled into think-
ing that they have a real option to decline. . . .  [T]his does not suggest unfettered
voluntariness in children’s decision-making.” Gerald P. Koocher, Different
Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 715
& n.14 (1992). After individuals waive their Miranda rights, they are open to the
psychological pressures of interrogation—“coercive police practices during inter-
rogations, relying on suggestions that something can be gained by confessing,
and exposure to key details about a crime making a  confession contaminated.”
Sahdev, supra note 231, at 1216–17. Factors consistently identified as contribut-
ing to police-induced false confessions of juveniles include: (1) prolonged ques-
tioning, (2) presence of authority figures, and (3) interrogation techniques used
by the police. Feld, Police Interrogations, supra note 231, at 241–46.
238. Drizin & Leo, supra note 233, at 946.
239. False confessions are “inextricably linked to police interrogation procedures.”
Spieirer, supra note 232, at 1730 (quoting Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman,
Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Sug-
gestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 154 (2003)). Juveniles “have fewer life
experience” and “psychological resources” to overcome pressures during interro-
gation. Feld, Police Interrogations, supra note 231, at 244. Further, evidence sug-
gests that in extreme circumstances, an interrogation “may significantly alter
children’s memories of events” causing them to falsely confess. Scott-Hayward,
supra note 237, at 67 (quoting Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police
Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. CTR. FOR CHILD & CTS. 151,
156 (1999)). Some false confessions are induced by police interrogators minimiz-
ing the seriousness of the crime leading the suspect to falsely confess in order to
“go home.” Kassin, supra note 234, at 202–03. Police routinely present false evi-
dence during interrogations with juveniles who often lack the mental ability to
challenge false evidence presented by an adult authority figure. See Sahdev,
supra note 231, at 1222. Similarly, juveniles are more likely than adults to falsely
confess when presented with false confessions from associates. See Drizin & Leo,
supra note 233, at 974–75.
240. The second largest category of false confessions occurred in rape interrogations
(9%) followed by arson (3%). Drizin & Leo, supra note 233, at 946–47.
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to ninety-six hours.241 Barry Feld found similar results in his study of
false confessions by juveniles concluding that “[a]lmost all cases of
proven false confessions involved lengthy interrogations.”242
It is also relevant that authority figures are the interrogators of
juveniles in false confessions cases. Children are taught to trust
adults and respect law enforcement officers.243 Because of this,
juveniles try to provide the “right” response to obtain their interroga-
tor’s approval.244 There is also a desire to avoid confrontation with
authority figures.245 Juveniles are aware of the power imbalance they
have with authority figures, which can cause communication problems
between them.246 Studies confirm “juveniles are extremely willing to
comply with authority figures” and are more easily “manipulated into
confessing falsely.”247
Finally, while most commentators believe that juveniles are more
likely than adults to give false confessions, some suggest that
juveniles are less likely to give false confessions than adults. Professor
Allison Redlich observes:
Because juveniles as a group are characterized as risk seekers, and perhaps
because juveniles are less likely to appreciate that life is not always fair, it is
possible that innocent juveniles (particularly younger ones) will be the least
likely to accept plea offers [or presumably make false confessions] compared to
guilty juveniles and compared to adults who are either innocent or guilty.
. . . .
. . . Though research has established that juveniles misjudged to be guilty are
at risk for falsely confessing in the context of police interrogations, the re-
search has also suggested that it is the combination of dispositional factors
(i.e., young age) and situational factors (i.e., overly long interrogations and
inappropriate interrogation techniques) that serve to increase the risk.248
All of the above research addresses police interrogations outside of
the school context. How it informs school interrogations is not entirely
241. Id. at 948–49.
242. Feld, Police Interrogations, supra note 231, at 295. Feld observed that in a recent
study finding 125 false confessions, “questioning lasted less than six hours in
16% of the cases, continued between six and twelve hours in one-third (34%) of
cases, persisted for between twelve and twenty-four hours in another one-third of
cases (39%), and continued from one to three days in the remaining 11% of the
cases.” Id. at 308. Lengthy interrogations lead to fatigue, which affects adolescent
decision making. Cleary, supra note 179, at 121.
243. Spierer, supra note 232, at 1741.
244. Id.
245. Kassin, supra note 234, at 203.
246. Cleary, supra note 179, at 122.
247. Spierer, supra note 232, at 1741 (quoting Laurel LaMontagne, Children Under
Pressure: The Problem of Juvenile False Confessions and Potential Solutions, 41
W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 38–39 (2013)).
248. Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False
Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 954–56 (2010) (citations omitted). Profes-
sor Redlich equates the issues of false confessions and false guilty pleas. Id. at
944.
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clear. It seems safe to assume that false confessions occur less often
from school interrogations than from ones conducted by police in sta-
tion houses. Indeed, given the evidence of quick confessions generated
from “short and amicable” police interrogations,249 it seems probable
that fewer, perhaps markedly fewer, false confessions emanate from
the generally less coercive environment of schoolhouse interrogations.
V. ELIMINATING MIRANDA REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOL
INTERROGATIONS
Commentators have recommended solutions to the issues sur-
rounding interrogations of juveniles identified in this Article. Some
argue that the mere presence of an SRO at a student’s interrogation
on school grounds in the absence of legal counsel transforms the en-
counter into a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.250
Such arguments claim the virtue of a bright-line rule251 settling the
case law chaos described in Part III above.
This Article proposes an opposite bright-line rule that removes Mi-
randa from school interrogations when school authorities are present.
While such interrogations do take on custodial aspects,252 this Article
argues that giving school students Miranda warnings is an exercise in
futility. The costs of such a requirement outweigh its benefits. Elimi-
nating Miranda from school interrogations will not leave students un-
protected from being coerced into incriminating themselves because
due process protections against the admissibility of coerced confes-
sions will still be in place. Moreover, contrary to the views of some
commentators,253 educational policy is actually promoted rather than
hindered by removing Miranda requirements from school interroga-
tions. Finally, this Article posits that existing Supreme Court case law
on roadside questioning provides precedent for exempting school in-
terrogations from a Miranda requirement.
249. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Brandenburg, School Bullies—They Aren’t Just Students:
Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning, 59 MERCER L. REV.
731, 733 (2008) (arguing “the necessity for Miranda warning”); Sally Terry
Green, A Presumptive In-Custody Analysis to Police-Conducted School Interroga-
tions, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 147–48, 148 n.15 (2013) (recommending states
adopt a presumption that SRO’s must provide Miranda warnings to children in
the school setting); North, supra note 47, at 477 (“[T]he mere presence of [an
SRO] . . . transforms the encounter into a custodial interrogation, and Miranda
warnings must be given.”); Price, supra note 104, at 567 (stating SROs must al-
ways follow “police protocol for interrogations”).
251. See Price, supra note 104.
252. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
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A. Miranda Warnings as Futile
The social science research described above evidences that
juveniles routinely cooperate with their interrogators. While the stud-
ies are overwhelmingly derived from interrogations outside the school
context,254 there is little reason to believe that students are less coop-
erative with school interrogations than they are with the police. In-
deed, students may be more inclined to cooperate with school
interrogators given the likely familiarity with their interrogators and
the general interrogation environment.
As noted above, when juveniles are given Miranda warnings, over
90% waive their rights and speak with the police.255 Such a high
waiver rate may be attributable to the unique inability of juveniles to
comprehend the warnings256 as well as a variety of other factors char-
acteristic of young people, none of which is likely to change.257
The evidence also establishes that the high rate of juvenile waivers
is not attributable to pressure from interrogators. Juveniles who con-
fess tend to confess “at the outset” of interrogation,258 often without
any police prodding.259 The incidence of quick confessions virtually
eliminates the risk that such confessions will ultimately prove false
given that “almost all cases of proven false confessions involved
lengthy interrogations”260 for the most serious felonies.261
Only a slight amount of information is lost to interrogators by giv-
ing the warnings because the vast majority of juveniles waive their
rights when warned.262 While giving the warnings makes little practi-
cal difference, failing to give them in perceived custodial interroga-
tions can have undesirable consequences. Consider the N.C. case
discussed above.263 There a student was escorted to the office of an
assistant principal who, in the company of the SRO, informed the stu-
dent of a report that the student had given a highly addictive opioid to
other students.264 The student immediately confessed. His confession
was held inadmissible in his subsequent criminal trial because the
court deemed it derived from custodial interrogation without Miranda
warnings. The facts present no basis for denying either the veracity
254. In Feld’s study, 6.2% of students interrogated were questioned by police at school.
Feld, Real Interrogation, supra note 223, at 10.
255. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 202–25 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text.
262. Holland, supra note 5, at 112.
263. See supra notes 106–28 and accompanying text.
264. N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 863 (Ky. 2013).
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nor the voluntariness of the confession. Its suppression thus rests en-
tirely on a wooden application of Miranda principles.
The conclusion of custodial interrogation in N.C. is highly subjec-
tive and at odds with similar cases.265 The social science data sug-
gests that it likely would have made no difference if the student had
been given the routinely waived warnings. The effect of Miranda ap-
plicability in N.C. was thus the unnecessary suppression of highly pro-
bative evidence of a serious crime.
A more sensible approach is to dispense with the requirement to
warn altogether. This ends the charade of courts reaching opposite
conclusions under similar facts.266 No longer should courts be re-
quired to apply a subjective totality of circumstances test to determine
whether a student was in custody when questioned at school.
B. Coerced Confession Protection
Eliminating Miranda still allows students the protections of the
due process coerced confession rule,267 requiring that confessions be
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances268 with the age of
the student being a highly relevant factor. Given the vulnerability of
young people when interrogated,269 courts should carefully scrutinize
confessions to assure that they are not the product of interrogators’
promises or threats, which are categories of inducement that have
been deemed sufficiently compelling to render resulting confessions
inadmissible under longstanding coerced confessions law.270 A confes-
sion would be inadmissible if under the facts of a given case a student
is coerced into confessing.
The due process coerced confession doctrine is notoriously
vague.271 Miranda supposedly addressed the vagueness problem by
requiring a clear set of black-letter rules for those subjected to custo-
dial interrogation.272 This assumes that it is clear when a suspect is in
265. See, e.g., People v. Kay, No. A145381, 2018 WL 636215 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31,
2018).
266. See supra subsection III.B.2.
267. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text for a description of the due process
test.
268. “Because the admissibility of statements given after a valid waiver of Miranda
rights must be determined on the basis of the voluntariness test, that test re-
mains vitally important.” Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession
Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2004 (1998).
269. See supra Part IV.
270. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 395 (5th ed. 2009). Given the
risk of false confession when interrogations are lengthy, I join commentators who
would prohibit interrogations exceeding four hours in duration. See Feld, Real
Interrogation, supra note 223, at 26–27.
271. See supra section II.A.
272. “Miranda . . . contained a set of rules to be followed by police in all future custo-
dial interrogations.” LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 270, at 368.
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custody. If the custody question is itself subject to a vague and subjec-
tive test, Miranda applicability has simply introduced a new level of
vagueness and subjectivity rather than solving those problems en-
tailed in the due process test. That is the situation with school
interrogations.
School interrogations entail restrictions of students’ physical free-
dom but occur within a familiar location with interrogators often
known to the student. School interrogations are thus sui generis and
require a unique rule. Therefore, the rule should be that whenever a
school official is present at a school interrogation, the interrogation is
outside the purview of Miranda, whether the official assumes an ac-
tive or passive role in the interrogation. As will be later explained, the
presence of the school official imbues the interrogation with an educa-
tional aspect compromised by Miranda warnings.
Removing a Miranda requirement would not preclude policymak-
ers from imposing a similar requirement by statute.273 Short of such
requirement, interrogators may choose on their own to warn students
of rights similar to Miranda warnings as a protection against a find-
ing of involuntariness of a confession given after the warnings.
C. Promoting Sound Educational Policy by Removing
Miranda Requirements
Some commentators admit that warning students of Miranda
rights during school interrogations is futile. One commentator, never-
theless, argues that the warnings should be given to teach students “a
valuable civics lesson: that authority in a democracy should be exer-
cised transparently and with appropriate checks beyond those of self-
restraint.”274 Another urges that applying Miranda to school interro-
gations ensures that juveniles “do not lose faith in the legal system”
and protects their “right to justice.”275
It is doubtful that simply asking a student whether or not he was
involved in wrongdoing without prior Miranda warnings would cause
him to lose faith in the legal system or offend his right to justice. It
may be that warning students of Miranda rights does teach a “valua-
ble civics lesson.” On the other hand, failing to give the warnings may
assist in teaching the interrogated student a more valuable lesson:
telling the truth and being accountable for one’s actions are virtues
fundamental to ordinary morality and good citizenship.276 The Mi-
273. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2015).
274. Holland, supra note 5, at 112.
275. Brandenburg, supra note 250, at 764.
276. For a thorough discussion of whether people have a moral duty to admit their
guilt when confronted by the criminal process, see R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as
a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 34–52 (1981).
Greenwalt wrote:
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randa warnings teach guilty students the opposite lesson: they are en-
titled to remain silent and avoid taking responsibility for their actions.
The Supreme Court acknowledges that educators have a role in
teaching students “the shared values of a civilized social order.”277
School authorities routinely urge honest responses when interrogating
students.278 Such admonitions are usually motivated by “custodial”
concerns aimed at maintaining a safe educational environment.279
But interrogations also present teaching moments where school au-
thorities assume the tutelary activity of teaching the virtue of truth
telling. This activity is the same one engaged in by parents who rou-
tinely urge their children to accept responsibility for their actions and
respect authority by telling the truth.280 In a study of youth ques-
tioned by police with their parents present, “[n]o defendants reported
that their parents advised them to remain silent.”281 Arguably, many
parents would prefer that school officials act in the same manner as
they would when assuming tutelary responsibilities over their
children.
Even if we believe that open admission of guilt is usually the course of
action that is best, we may hesitate to say that someone has a moral
duty to bring conviction and imprisonment upon himself.
. . . Do persons acquire a moral privilege to lie or to remain silent when
their own original wrongful acts have caused the state’s antago-
nism? . . . [E]ven though a person is responsible for the state’s justified
enmity, the state’s adoption of an antagonistic position may weaken his
responsibilities toward it.
Id. at 36–37. While a guilty adult’s moral duty to confess to criminal charges may
not exist in all contexts, a stronger moral case exists for urging juveniles to as-
sume responsibility for their wrongful actions. See infra notes 277–81 and accom-
panying text.
277. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
278. See e.g., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
279. Educators assume “custodial and tutelary” roles. See supra note 45.
280. See Alberts, supra note 195, at 123. Judge Henry J. Friendly famously said in
discussing the privilege against self-incrimination:
[W]hile the other [testimonial] privileges accord with the notions of de-
cent conduct generally accepted in life outside the court room, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination defies them. No parent would teach such
a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while a mis-
deed, even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a
clean breast of it will not be. Every hour of the day people are being
asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers, and teachers.
Those who are questioned consider themselves to be morally bound to
respond, and the questioners believe it proper to take action if they do
not.
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 680 (1968).
281. Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants:
Predictors of Confessions, Please, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals,
29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005).
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As Justice Harlan observed, “[P]eaceful interrogation is not one of
the dark moments of the law.”282 It is less dark when juveniles are the
ones being interrogated. The vast majority of juveniles who confess
during school interrogations will be dealt with through the juvenile
justice system, if dealt with at all through a judicial process.283 In the-
ory at least, the juvenile system is more rehabilitative than the crimi-
nal justice system.284 In recent years, the juvenile system has in some
jurisdictions become punitive,285 at least in part.286 Despite a line of
cases calling into question the effectiveness of rehabilitation in juve-
nile justice systems,287 the Supreme Court has been “reluctant to say
that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, [the juvenile sys-
tem] still does not hold promise.”288 Probation, with conditions ad-
dressing the rehabilitative needs of the individual young person,289 is
by far the most common disposition in juvenile courts.290
Miranda warnings are at odds with a rehabilitative juvenile justice
model where cooperation between the juvenile and the State is essen-
tial. Confessions are thus to be encouraged under the rationale of ju-
venile courts where “confession of one’s deeds would be regarded as an
integral part of the therapeutic process, conducive to establishing the
trust and confidence toward officials that aid personalized treat-
282. Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
283. See MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 163–69 (5th ed. 2018).
Of course, many school interrogations deal with violations of school rules resolved
through school administrative actions.
284. Id.
285. In some jurisdictions, utilization of punishment in juvenile courts is systemic.
See, e.g., Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
UCLA. L. REV. 503, 528–31 (1984) (describing Washington State’s adoption of a
punitive juvenile justice model); see also In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008)
(holding a right to jury trial under Kansas punitive juvenile system).
286. See, e.g., In re Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (finding that
fixed sentences for juveniles committing certain “designated felon[ies]” consti-
tutes punishment).
287. See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury:
Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1,
25–30 (2012) (discussing Kent, Gault, and Winship cases).
288. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). For an argument that the
Supreme Court’s recognition of the inherent differences between adolescents and
adults entails a constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to be rehabili-
tated within the juvenile justice system, see Martin Gardner, Youthful Offenders
and the Eighth Amendment Right to Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Punish-
ment of Juveniles, 83 TENN. L. REV. 455 (2016).
289. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 503–04.
290. In 2017, formal probation was ordered in 63% of all adjudicated cases, with resi-
dential placements imposed in 28% of all adjudicated cases. Adjudicated Delin-
quency Cases by Disposition:1985–2018, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/court/qa06501.asp
[https://perma.unl.edu/W4XD-ME8L].
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ment.”291 Thus, urging students to tell the truth not only teaches a
vital moral virtue but also assists in the rehabilitative process should
a confession lead to a juvenile court proceeding.
D. Removing Miranda from School Interrogations Is
Consistent with Existing Supreme Court Case Law
As noted above, the Supreme Court has never decided a case ad-
dressing the applicability of Miranda for interrogations conducted
solely by school authorities. Assuming that the Court would agree
with the “clear rule” of the lower courts that Miranda does not apply
in those circumstances,292 the question is whether it makes a differ-
ence that law enforcement personnel participate in the interrogation.
The possible consequences to the juvenile are the same whether he
confesses to a sole school official or to a police officer. The confession
may lead to possible juvenile or even criminal court proceedings
against the juvenile in either case.293 Whether the interrogation is
“law enforcement” rather than “school” oriented makes little differ-
ence from the point of view of the student.”294
J.D.B. recognizes that school interrogations are subject to Miranda
requirements if the student is deemed “in custody.”295 The Court real-
izes “that it is occasionally difficult” for police and courts to determine
custody.296 Determinations of custody in school interrogations are in-
herently difficult. The cases reveal that the supposed “objective analy-
sis” espoused by the J.D.B. Court does not give anywhere near the
“clear guidance” the test is aimed at providing.297 Attempting to apply
the custody test to school interrogations amounts to a “transformation
of the Miranda custody test—from a clear, easily applied . . . rule into
a highly fact-sensitive standard resembling the voluntariness test
that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory.”298
The Court should reconsider its position taken in J.D.B. and hold
Miranda inapplicable to school interrogations when school authorities
291. Kenneth I. Winston, Self-Incrimination in Context: Establishing Procedural Pro-
tections in Juvenile and College Disciplinary Proceedings, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 813,
834 (1975).
292. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., D.Z. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 246 (Ind. 2018) (student’s confession to a sole
school official led to a delinquency adjudication in juvenile court). Statutes in all
jurisdictions permit juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over some juveniles to
criminal courts for acts of delinquency. See DAVIS, supra note 46, at 227–77.
294. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
296. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 283 (Alito, J., dissenting) (objecting to factoring age of student into custody
inquiry).
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are present.299 Doing so would not be the first time the Court has
found Miranda inapplicable to a given context arguably constituting
custodial interrogation.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,300 the Court addressed whether roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
constituted custodial interrogation.301 The Court found that the “sig-
nificant curtail[ment]” of the “freedom of action” of drivers and pas-
sengers of stopped vehicles does not constitute Miranda custody.302
The Court concluded that traffic stops are not the “types of situations”
at issue in Miranda.303 First, detentions for traffic stops are “pre-
sumptively temporary and brief,” usually lasting only a few minutes
comparatively, while station house questioning “frequently is pro-
longed” with the detainee often believing that “questioning will con-
tinue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.”304
Second, circumstances of “typical traffic stop[s] are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.”305 The public
nature of a traffic stop minimizes an unscrupulous policeman’s abili-
ties to use illegitimate means to extract confessions as well as reduces
the detainee’s fear that failure to cooperate will subject him to
abuse.306 As the Court stated, “[T]he atmosphere surrounding an ordi-
nary traffic stop is substantially less ‘police dominated’ than that sur-
rounding the [station house] interrogation at issue in Miranda.”307
Thus, “[P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”308
There are apparent similarities between routine traffic stops and
school interrogations with school officials present. Given the likeli-
hood of juveniles to confess almost immediately upon being interro-
gated,309 school interrogations are almost always brief. This negates
the concerns of prolonged interrogations. School interrogations, like
roadside questioning, lack the police domination characteristic of sta-
tion house interrogations. The “police” are often not present during
school interrogations. When police are present, almost always it is an
299. Regarding the arguable futility of giving Miranda warnings to juveniles, the
Court acknowledged the studies questioning the ability of juveniles to compre-
hend Miranda warnings but dismissed their relevance to the issue in J.D.B. be-
cause no Miranda warnings were given. Id. at 270 n.4 (majority opinion).
300. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
301. Id. at 435.
302. Id. at 436.
303. Id. at 437.
304. Id. at 438.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 438–39.
308. Id. at 440.
309. See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text. The studies show that interroga-
tions tend to be brief even when students do not confess.
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SRO whom the student recognizes. This minimizes fears students
might otherwise have that they will be abused for failure to cooperate.
Such fears are further minimized, if not eliminated altogether, by the
presence of the school official familiar to the student. In short, school
interrogations with school officials present, like roadside questioning,
do not constitute the type of situation at issue in Miranda and should
not be considered “custodial.”310
VI. CONCLUSION
Miranda warnings are required when persons are subjected to cus-
todial interrogation. Whether students are in custody for Miranda
purposes when they are interrogated by school officials and SROs is a
problem presently vexing the courts. “[O]ne of the principal advan-
tages of the doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before be-
ing interrogated while in custody is the clarity of that rule.”311
However, this advantage is lost in school interrogations. The suppos-
edly workable objective standard favored by the Supreme Court in its
J.D.B. case for determining the custody issue has proven to be a
highly fact-sensitive issue in school interrogations with courts reach-
ing contrary conclusions under similar facts.
This Article offers a solution to this quandary by recommending
removal of the Miranda requirement when school officials are present
during school interrogations. The warnings are largely ineffective in
informing juveniles of their rights. Even when effective, mandating
Miranda warnings runs contrary to sound educational policy encour-
aging truth telling by students. Further, the Miranda requirement
can have the effect of suppressing trustworthy and highly probative
confession evidence even though the confession is voluntary under
traditional due process principles. School interrogations manifest a
context outside the purview of Miranda applicability similar to road-
side questioning. It is time for Miranda to be removed from school
interrogations.
310. Denying Miranda rights to juveniles in school interrogations is at home with the
Court’s recognition that school students do not necessarily enjoy the same consti-
tutional rights as adults. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
311. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430.
